THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
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One of the first cases I teach in my required first-year course on
1
constitutional law is McCulloch v. Maryland. Like other constitutional
law teachers, I use McCulloch in part as a preview of approaches to
constitutional interpretation—it offers up historical, textual, structural, and representation-reinforcing theories of interpretation. Most
relevant here, I emphasize that the historical approach to constitutional interpretation in McCulloch actually represents two approaches.
The first is what constitutional scholars most readily think of as historical interpretation: originalism. That is the approach that many
papers in this conference take, and the primary questions to which
this conference is addressed. Following that approach, much ink has
been spilled on the original meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment,
the relationship between precursors to the Amendment and the
Amendment itself, and the relationship between the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
The second historical approach in McCulloch leads to a very different kind of historical endeavor. This approach assumes that constitutional understandings are elaborated by historical practice in American history long after the founding. Relevant history in McCulloch
does not end with the writing of the Constitution; it develops over
time up to the very moment of judicial intervention. McCulloch thus
suggests that the ways in which laypeople, politicians, scholars, lawyers, and jurists interpret the Constitution during the decades and
centuries since 1789 offer up important glosses on constitutional
meaning.
It is this second historical approach—the nonoriginalist historical
approach—that this paper engages. What concerns me here is not
what the Thirteenth Amendment meant in originalist terms, but how
its meaning has changed over time. Unsurprisingly, dominant currents of political thought have influenced interpretations of the

*

1

Professor of Law and History, Caddell & Chapman Research Professor, University of Virginia; Stephen and Barbara Friedman Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School. I would
like to thank Rich Schragger, Meera Trehan, and the American Constitution Society.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

1451

1452

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:5

Amendment at any given moment. The meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment has diverged widely at different moments in history—
emphasizing the right to contract during the Lochner era, New Deal
labor and economic rights in the 1930s and 1940s, and desegregation
and antidiscrimination during the civil rights era of the 1960s.
These shifting historical meanings of the Thirteenth Amendment
offer up a resource for thinking about the Amendment’s purview today. That said, there is no linear or inexorable relationship between
these changing meanings of the Thirteenth Amendment and new
doctrinal arguments based on the Amendment. Historical evidence
does not lead to the conclusion that the Thirteenth Amendment requires any particular legal outcome. History can, however, provide
resources for constitutional interpretation on two levels. First, it reveals ways of thinking about the Amendment that have since disappeared from mainstream constitutional thought. These alternative
understandings of the Amendment can re-open questions that have
long been thought settled. Second, exploring the Amendment’s
changing meanings invites scholars to contemplate the relationship
between constitutional interpretations and historical contexts. By
analyzing that relationship in particular historical settings, current
scholars and lawyers can gain a better understanding of why they use
the Thirteenth Amendment as they do today, and how they might do
so more self-consciously and without unnecessary (and perhaps unpersuasive) claims to legitimacy through original intent.
Toward these ends, this paper explores the ways in which political
developments affected the understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment during the fifteen years of constitutional and civil rights uncertainty that lasted from the New Deal revolution until the Supreme
2
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education. During that period,
lawyers in the newly created Civil Rights Section (“CRS”) of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) used the New Deal as a springboard for a
new and quite expansive understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment. Exploring their efforts at reinterpretation underscores both
the process and the lessons of the nonoriginalist historical approach
3
to constitutional interpretation.
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***
When CRS lawyers began aggressively prosecuting Thirteenth
Amendment cases in the late 1930s and 1940s, they inherited a way of
thinking about the Amendment closely tied to the Lochner era. During the early twentieth century, the Department of Justice had prosecuted southern officials and individual employers under the Peonage
Act of 1867. A statutory enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment,
that act prohibited peonage, a form of involuntary servitude in which
a worker was forced to work out a debt to an employer. In the 1905
case of Clyatt v. United States and the 1914 case of United States v. Rey4
nolds, the Court upheld the Peonage Act and indictments under it.
Moreover, in the 1911 state criminal case of Bailey v. Alabama, the
Court invalidated a state contract labor law common in the South.
The law presumed a criminal intent to defraud when an employee
accepted an advance from an employer but broke his labor contract
5
without repaying his debt to his employer.
The Court’s opinions in these cases predictably reflected a Lochner-era focus on contractual freedom. The problem in Bailey, as the
Court saw it, was that the Alabama law functionally required specific
performance for the breaking of a labor contract. Although decided
under the Peonage Act and the Thirteenth Amendment, the language and logic of contract law and contract rights pervaded the opinion: “[t]he full intent of the constitutional provision could be defeated with obvious facility if, through the guise of contracts under
which advances had been made, debtors could be held to compulsory
service. . . . The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss
6
due to the breach, but not to enforced labor.” In these peonage cases, as in many Lochner-era cases, the Supreme Court saw itself as intervening sporadically into private relationships to ensure the contrac7
tual freedom of the parties.
Even after the Lochner framework began to lose its hold on constitutional understandings of individual rights in the late 1930s, the
debt element of peonage kept enforcement of the Thirteenth
Amendment closely tied to its contract-based interpretation. Although many instances of forced labor during the first half of the
4
5
6
7
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century did not involve contracted debt—as where employers maintained immobility through violence or threats of violence—every successful federal involuntary servitude prosecution before 1937 involved contractual indebtedness. All three involuntary servitude cases
that reached the Supreme Court during World War II—Taylor v.
8
9
10
Georgia, United States v. Gaskin, and Pollock v. Williams —also conformed to the conventional definition of peonage: all three involved
11
contracted debt, and all three arose under the Peonage Act of 1867.
During World War II, however, lawyers in the CRS began to unshackle the Thirteenth Amendment from the contract-based framework of the Lochner era. They began to draw on the New Deal rather
than Lochner as they conceptualized both the government’s role in
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment and the substance of the
Amendment’s prohibitions. This new conceptualization led to three
new and expansive interpretations of the Amendment. The first concerned the government’s role: the lawyers shifted their understanding of the government’s role from one in which the government occasionally intervened into private contracts that had gone wrong to
one in which the government had an ongoing obligation to protect
individuals from rights violations. The second two New Deal-based
interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment were more substantive.
In the second, the CRS lawyers drew on the New Deal’s commitment
to free labor protections to inform the content of the Thirteenth
Amendment. In the third, they drew on the New Deal’s guarantee of
a minimum standard of living and working.
***
The New Deal influenced the CRS lawyers’ understanding of the
Thirteenth Amendment in the first instance by providing the lawyers
with a new model of the role of government in protecting rights.
During the Lochner era, lawyers and judges had thought about peonage in terms of debt and the policing of contracts. Once the New
Deal offered wide-ranging statutory protections to many Americans,
the government lawyers began to see an ongoing relationship between individuals and the federal government, with the government
offering affirmative protection of rights. They increasingly under-
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stood peonage as a “[f]ederally-[s]ecured [r]ight to [b]e [f]ree
12
[f]rom [b]ondage.”
This conceptual transformation was rooted in the New Deal’s
overall guarantees of security. “Security” in the economic sense was
the watchword of the federal government’s attack on the Depression
of the 1930s. New Deal legislation attempted to provide such economic security (mostly for white men) through unemployment insurance, public works projects, Social Security, relief, the protection of
unions, and other economic and social welfare programs. The New
Deal thus demonstrated that the exercise of government power, rather than its restraint, might serve to safeguard the vulnerable. Attorney General Biddle made this very point in a lecture he delivered
at the end of 1942. He acknowledged that the Founders had been
most concerned with a limited government. He argued, however,
that after the Industrial Revolution, Americans came to realize that
“the powers of unregulated business had to be checked by transfer13
ring much of their control from private to public hands.”
The Truman administration reinforced this new emphasis on the
government’s provision of affirmative protections. When President
Harry S. Truman created his groundbreaking Committee on Civil
14
Rights in 1946, he declared the end of complacency “with a civil liberties program which emphasizes only the need of protection against
15
the possibility of tyranny by the Government.” Modern conditions
required the creation of “new concepts of civil rights to safeguard our
16
heritage.”
The “extension of civil rights today,” Truman announced, “means, not protection of the people against the Govern17
ment, but protection of the people by the Government.”
In its final report, Truman’s Committee argued that increased national authority for protecting civil rights extended the “positive governmental programs designed to solve the nation’s changing prob18
lems.” The report described how the Supreme Court had found in

12
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Sydney Brodie, The Federally-Secured Right to Be Free from Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367 (1952).
FRANCIS BIDDLE, DEMOCRATIC THINKING AND THE WAR: THE WILLIAM H. WHITE LECTURES
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA [1942–1943], at 19 (1944).
See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS vii (1947) [hereinafter TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS] (quoting Harry S. Truman,
Statement on Executive Order 9808 (Dec. 5, 1946) (establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights)).
Address Before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1947
PUB. PAPERS 311 (June 29, 1947).
Id.
Id.
TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 106.
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the Constitution a “basis for governmental action at the national level . . . for such policies as the control of prices; regulation of agricultural production; requirement of collective bargaining; social security
benefits for millions of people; prohibitions of industrial monopo19
lies,” and more. The Committee built on those interpretations, concluding that “freedom in a civilized society is always founded on law
20
enforced by government.”
Truman and his committee also rejected the notion that the new
governmental duty to provide security began and ended with economic security. Invoking FDR’s identification of “Freedom From
Fear” as one of the Four Freedoms, the committee’s report made
clear that fear did not stem from economic hardship and uncertainty
21
alone. It grew as well out of the personal insecurity of living as a racial minority in a society that publicly and privately, systematically and
informally, oppressed such minorities. As a result, freedom from fear
now required not only the economic safety net the New Deal had
provided mostly white workers but also freedom from involuntary
22
servitude, lynching, and police brutality for African Americans.
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, then, the New Deal’s catchphrase of “economic security” had mutated in some contexts into the
“security of the person” or “the safety and security of the person.”
The phrase drew on a venerable but long-submerged understanding
of civil rights, with common law roots traceable to Blackstone’s 1765
23
Commentaries and statutory roots in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and
24
the Freedman’s Bureau Bill of the same year. Eighty years later, the
security of the person formed a central component of the report of
25
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in 1947. And it was the
phrase used to describe the category of harms that included involuntary servitude and peonage, lynching, and police brutality in the first
26
casebook on civil rights, published in 1952.
19
20
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See Frank Coleman, Freedom from Fear on the Home Front, 29 IOWA L. REV. 415, 416 (1944)
(describing how federal prosecutions of lynch mobs and “village tyrants” following Pearl
Harbor helped secure “freedom from fear”).
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *117, *125.
See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Freedman’s Bureau Bill, ch.
200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866).
See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 14, at vii.
1 THOMAS I. EMERSON & DAVID HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A COLLECTION OF LEGAL AND RELATED MATERIALS 1 (2d ed. 1958) (noting that
“[t]he right to security of the person . . . is a fundamental right”). Language about the
“security of the person” also occasionally resurfaced in some of the signal civil rights dis-
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Drawing on this conception of “the security of the person,” and
this New Deal approach to civil rights more generally, the CRS lawyers rejected the essence of Lochner-era peonage cases as the occasional interference of courts into private contracts. Instead, they focused on a direct, ongoing relationship between the executive branch
of the federal government and its citizens. In fact, they saw the Thirteenth Amendment as a particularly apt site for this new conception
because, as CRS lawyer Sidney Brodie noted, the victims of peonage
were often “defenseless or without capacity to pursue [their] personal
27
remedies,” and the government needed to “act on its own initiative.”
Once the CRS lawyers based their understanding of the government’s role in Thirteenth Amendment cases on a positive conception
of rights, their use of the Amendment and related statutes changed.
They began to use the Thirteenth Amendment beyond the specific,
time-worn cases of peonage proper and beyond prosecutions under
the Peonage Act itself. In Circular No. 3591, Attorney General Biddle
requested that United States attorneys “defer[] [prosecutions under
the peonage statute] in favor of building the cases around the issue
of involuntary servitude and slavery . . . disregarding entirely the ele28
ment of debt.” To accomplish this shift from contract-based peonage to the “federally-secured right to be free from bondage,” the CRS
lawyers revitalized other statutory weapons from the recent and distant past. The section put to use a Slave Kidnapping Statute from
1866, which prohibited the holding of a person as a slave, as well as
the 1932 Lindbergh Law, a federal kidnapping law passed after the
abduction of Charles Lindbergh’s infant son. Most significantly, for
the first time since the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Department of Justice used general civil rights laws to prosecute involuntary servitude cases not based on an underlying debt. Once the
CRS lawyers read the Thirteenth Amendment as establishing a federal right, a pair of Reconstruction criminal civil rights statutes could
provide far broader authority for prosecution than the Peonage Act
alone. Section 51 of the criminal code criminalized all conspiracies

sents of the late nineteenth century, such as the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 115–19 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555–56,
560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27

Brodie, supra note 12, at 376.
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to violate rights guaranteed against private interference, and Section
52 criminalized all governmental violations of constitutional rights.
Because the Thirteenth Amendment lacked a state action requirement, it protected the right to be free from bondage against virtually
29
all comers.
Even before Biddle made it a policy to use these general civil
rights statutes, the CRS had begun experimenting with a variety of
statutory cocktails that suggested the New Deal demotion of debt and
contract. The celebrated prosecution of the notorious William T.
Cunningham in Oglethorpe County, Georgia, offers a prime example. As anti-peonage crusader William Henry Huff and others publicized, Cunningham had provided his workers with so little food they
frequently went hungry. He threatened to beat them with a pistol if
they could not keep his pace. And he hunted his terrified, escaping
workers all the way from Georgia to Chicago, where he convinced the
police to arrest them. Cunningham’s indictment included counts of
conspiracy to deprive the farmworkers of the right to be free from
slavery and involuntary servitude under § 51 and counts of holding
them as slaves under the Slave Kidnapping statute, as well as the tra30
ditional counts of peonage under the 1867 act.
CRS investigations into the servitude of young black men working
in the Florida cane fields illustrate the change even more dramatically. After Biddle’s circular, case titles altered from “Peonage” to
“Involuntary Servitude,” and so did the emphasis of the FBI’s questions and the lawyers’ analyses of their trial evidence. Before Biddle’s
circular, questions and memos had focused on the amount and details of the debts the youngsters owed the sugar company. Afterwards, the lawyers wrote memos organizing their investigative reports

29
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1964, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 608–09 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds.,
1971)); Brodie, supra note 12, at 367 (noting the useful statutes that deal with slavery, involuntary servitude, or peonage). For the statutes, see Slave Kidnapping Act, ch. 86, § 1,
14 Stat. 50 (1866) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1583 (2000)); Lindbergh Kidnapping
Act, ch. 271, § 1, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1202 (2000));
Brodie, supra note 12, at 374 n.34 (citing unreported cases, including the unreported
case of United States v. Gantt, No. 10, 031n (N.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 1949), which resulted in
prosecution under forced labor statutes).
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supra note 3, at 147, 324 n.14 (citing “Memorandum, May 1941, [file] 50-708, [RG 60, National Archives]” [hereinafter DOJ Files]); I.L.D. Brings Charge of Peonage Against Georgia
Planter, DAILY WORKER, Nov. 20, 1939, at 5.
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by references to threats, shootings, and beatings, among other
31
things.
Safeguarding the security of Americans against both public and
private rights violations was institutionally, doctrinally, and culturally
different from enforcing the narrow terms of the Peonage Act. The
New Deal had begun this trend with its promise of economic security.
The CRS lawyers broadened it to include African Americans’ rights to
the “safety and security of the person,” prime among which was the
right to be free from bondage. This conceptual shift suggested that
African Americans as well as whites deserved “security,” that that security went beyond economics, and that affirmative federal power
could and should be used to protect individuals. When the CRS expanded the “economic security” of the New Deal into the “safety and
security” of African Americans, they transformed the Thirteenth
Amendment from a bulwark against constitutionally problematic contracts into a positive guarantee of freedom from servitude.
***
The CRS lawyers drew on the New Deal not only in thinking about
the role of government in enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment but
also to fill in the very substance of the Amendment’s protections.
The second reconceptualization of the Thirteenth Amendment thus
emerged out of the New Deal’s commitment to free labor. In particular, it emerged out of the New Deal’s particular vision of what free
labor meant.
Since the debates that accompanied its proposal, advocates of an
expansive vision of the Thirteenth Amendment had generally agreed
that it was meant not only to end slavery and involuntary servitude
but that it should, in the words of Attorney General Biddle, also
guarantee “a system of completely free and voluntary la32
bor . . . throughout the United States.” What made labor free for
the CRS lawyers during and after World War II differed substantially
from what had made it free in the free-labor ideology of Reconstruction and in the freedom-of-contract jurisprudence of the Lochner era,
however. During the Reconstruction era, the term carried connota-

31
32

GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 109–114, 324 (citing DOJ files, 50-18-15).
Francis Biddle, Civil Rights and the Federal Law, in SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY TODAY:
THE EDWARD L. BERNAYS LECTURES OF 1944 GIVEN AT CORNELL UNIVERSITY 109–144
(1945). For the classic treatment of antebellum free labor ideology, see ERIC FONER,
FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE
CIVIL WAR 11–51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1970).
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tions of the right to pursue a calling, the dignity of labor, and the autonomy of the individual. It also embraced the opportunity to find
jobs, to advance economically, and to receive just compensation for
labor. This ideal provided part of the basis for Lochner-era liberty of
contract, and it persisted with some force even after the Lochner era
33
ended.
The “free and voluntary labor” to which Biddle tied the Thirteenth Amendment drew more directly on the New Deal, however.
The essence of free labor became rights to organize, bargain, and
strike. “The tendency of modern economic life toward integration
and centralized control,” an early version of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) stated, “has long since destroyed the balance of
bargaining power between the individual employer and the individual employee, and has rendered the individual, unorganized worker
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just reward
34
for his services, and to preserve a decent standard of living.” In order for the free-labor ideology of the Reconstruction and Lochner eras
to become a reality in the twentieth-century United States, workers
35
had to have the right to act collectively.
Even as the New Deal took steps to protect these labor rights, it
largely forsook black workers’ rights by accommodating the racial hierarchies and economic coercion of the southern labor market. The
NLRA, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and the Social Security Act (“SSA”) all exempted from coverage the agricultural and do36
mestic work that most African Americans in the South performed.
The National Recovery Administration failed to eliminate regional

33

34
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36

For an excellent discussion of laborers’ changing conceptions of free labor in the postbellum period, see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 782–787, 801–814. See also James Gray Pope, Labor and
the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1096–1104
(1987); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 962–66 (1997);
Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437,
437–39 (1989); Risa Lauren Goluboff, The Work of Civil Rights in the 1940s: The Department of Justice, the NAACP, and African American Agricultural Labor 17–63 (Nov.
2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author).
Labor Disputes Act, 78 CONG. REC. 3,444 (1934).
See generally James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor
and the Shaping of American Constitution Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46–122
(2002).
For the NLRA, see National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000)). For the FLSA, see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 13(a)(6), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201–219 (2000)). For the SSA, see Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 210(b)(1)–(2),
811(b)(1)–(2), 907(c)(1)–(2), 49 Stat. 620, 625, 639, 643 (1935) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 301 (2000)).
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wage differentials, and its local administrators maintained racial differentials through discriminatory implementation. Locally administered federal relief agencies similarly catered to the Southern system
by customarily cutting from the rolls workers needed for agricultural
work during planting and harvesting seasons. And the Agricultural
Adjustment Act even strengthened the economic power of white
planters at the expense of white and black tenants and sharecrop37
pers. New Deal legislation thus simultaneously embraced a new, robust definition of free labor and excluded from it a significant portion of American workers. Without addressing these New Deal biases
and attacking the Southern labor market as a whole, the CRS lawyers
38
realized, free labor would remain an elusive goal.
Drawing on this New Deal conception of free labor, the CRS used
the Thirteenth Amendment to broaden the application of New Deal
principles beyond the federal protections themselves. CRS lawyers’
Thirteenth Amendment practice targeted for constitutional protection precisely those workers the New Deal left unprotected and unions left organized. As the lawyers saw the problem, workers who
could not move physically or occupationally to exert market pressure
were poor candidates for labor organization. The immobility created
by pervasive Southern laws—vagrancy, hitchhiking, contract labor,
anti-enticement, and emigrant agent licensing laws—posed a barrier
to organization and bargaining. It therefore posed a barrier to the
full and effective implementation of New Deal free labor principles.
The ability to protect oneself from coercion by exercising the right to
strike and the right to work for minimum wages under minimally acceptable conditions had become the means by which American workers would resist labor exploitation. They were the means by which
workers could protect themselves against the kind of involuntary servitude the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited. Contemporary commentator Howard Devon Hamilton recognized this when he included
“resistance to organization and movement of agricultural labor”

37

See 1 HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A
NATIONAL ISSUE 34–57 (1978); NANCY J. WEISS, FAREWELL TO THE PARTY OF LINCOLN:
BLACK POLITICS IN THE AGE OF FDR 163–68 (1983); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and
Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 76 (1999); see also IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005).

38

For discussions of the existence of a separate southern labor market until World War II,
see GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (1986) and BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, FROM COTTON BELT TO SUNBELT:
FEDERAL POLICY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH,
1938–1980, at 1–85 (Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1991).
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among the obstacles that workers faced in violation of “the Thirteenth Amendment’s objective of a system of completely free and vo39
luntary labor throughout the United States.”
Over the course of World War II, top Justice Department officials
increasingly tied the Thirteenth Amendment to such unfettered regional and national mobility. By the time Justice (and former Attorney General) Robert Jackson penned the opinion in the 1944 peon40
age case of Pollock v. Williams, Attorney General Biddle had set
himself squarely behind using the Thirteenth Amendment to create a
unified labor market unimpeded by southern attempts to control the
region’s black laborers. In Pollock, the Court invalidated a contract
labor statute similar to the laws the Court had struck down more than
41
thirty years earlier in Bailey v. Alabama and less than two years before
42
in Taylor v. Georgia. Despite the doctrinal similarities, the Court’s
language indicated a newly expansive view of unconstitutional involuntary servitude deeply inflected with New Deal conceptions of free
labor.
Where the Bailey opinion emphasized the constitutionality of various mechanisms of enforcing contracts, Pollock emphasized the relationship between this particular law and the labor market as a whole.
Justice Jackson could not fathom the purpose behind a law meant to
bind employees to particular employers. Rather, he saw “the right to
change employers” as the worker’s prime “defense against oppressive
43
hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment.” He maintained that
“[w]hen the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the
obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions
44
of work.” Jackson warned that the “[r]esulting depression of working conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer under
the system, but every other with whom his labor comes in competi45
tion.” Laws such as Florida’s contract labor statute, Jackson cautioned, not only imposed immobility on particular individuals, but
they depressed the labor market as a whole and infringed on the
46
rights of all workers.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment:
What Is Not Involuntary Servitude, 10 NAT’L B.J. pt. 2, 72. (1952).
322 U.S. 4 (1943).
219 U.S. 241 (1911).
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Justice Department lawyers took Justice Jackson’s observations and
ran with them. They saw that many state and local laws were designed to keep the southern labor market impermeable. So long as
such laws continued to restrict some laborers in their bargaining
power, laborers of all kinds and in all regions of the nation would not
be truly free. Echoing Jackson, section lawyer Brodie discussed
“[t]he depressing effect of slave labor upon our society and economic
47
system” in his 1951 article. He described “the detriment suffered by
the public as well as by the individual victim who is forced to work for
48
another against his will [as] serious and substantial.”
A United
States Attorney from Alabama was even more specific about the relationship between peonage and the labor market. The purpose of using contract labor laws, he explained, was to get individuals “to work
for less money than labor could be obtained ordinarily in the open
49
market.”
Biddle and the lawyers in the Justice Department thus read Pollock
and the other wartime cases as “substantially strengthen[ing] the federal guaranty of freedom from involuntary servitude.” According to
Biddle, Pollock placed “the right to freedom from involuntary servitude on so broad a base that the way has been opened to an attack on
the ‘enticing labor’ and ‘emigrant agent’ statutes, and some of the
vagrancy statutes and ‘work or fight’ orders.” The department had
learned from experience that such laws had “proved to be in reality
indirect means of enforcing involuntary servitude, especially against
Negro farm hands and laborers.” These laws were the very ones that
minimized African American mobility, made employment recruitment impracticable in the South, and closed off the channels of in50
formation necessary to facilitate widespread migration for work.
As a result, CRS lawyers and U.S. attorneys during and after the
war made wholesale, rather than retail, efforts to eliminate peonage
by ensuring that justices of the peace, county sheriffs, and local prosecutors knew when they were violating the Thirteenth Amendment.
United States Attorneys lobbied legislatures to repeal contract labor
statutes like those the Supreme Court had struck down. They tried to
educate law enforcement officials by speaking at events like annual

47
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See GOLUBOFF, supra note 3, at 157, 326 n.37 (citing “Percy C. Fountain to attorney general, July 15, 1948, DOJ Files, 50-1-24”).
See Goluboff, supra note 3, at 1656 n.180 (citing Francis Biddle, Civil Rights and the Federal Law, Speech at Cornell University 25 (Oct. 4, 1944) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)).

1464

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:5

meetings of the Georgia Peace Officers Association. And they repeatedly wrote local officials about laws the Supreme Court had held
unconstitutional. They told the officials to “read [the Pollock opinion] in full, so that you will understand the ruling of the Supreme
51
Court.”
In its second use of the New Deal to inform the Thirteenth
Amendment, then, the CRS not only targeted laws that created a particular employment relationship from which exit was difficult but also
the larger legal framework that made it difficult for workers to leave
all employment relationships. Drawing on unrealized New Deal aspirations for a free national labor market, Biddle concluded that vindicating the Thirteenth Amendment meant far more than stopping a
particular employer from directly coercing a particular employee. It
meant protecting truly free labor, even in the South and even, “especially,” for southern African Americans. Biddle and his staff thus took
the old, abolitionist, free-labor ideology, transformed it from the
Lochner era for service in the post-New Deal era, and tried to make it
constitutionally foundational.
***
The third influence of the New Deal on the CRS’s understanding
of the Thirteenth Amendment similarly reflected unfulfilled New
Deal aspirations. As the nation put the war behind it, and predictions
of a postwar recession largely fell flat, the CRS began to suggest that
black agricultural and domestic workers, who had not shared significantly in either the wartime economic boom or the nation’s postwar
prosperity, might nonetheless find some measure of economic security in the Thirteenth Amendment. More than a decade after the
New Deal promised better working conditions and an economic
safety net for most Americans, these African American men and
women were still denied rights to the most basic economic security.
The New Deal’s guarantees of economic security in the FLSA, the
SSA, and other laws were as racially exclusionary as the NLRA’s protections of labor rights. As the Civil Rights Section turned its attention to the conditions in which these workers lived and worked, its
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cases suggested that no worker in the United States, not even those
excluded by political compromise, could constitutionally endure such
extreme economic privation. The lawyers suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment might protect workers unable to take advantage
of New Deal economic rights, just as it might protect those unable to
take advantage of New Deal labor rights.
As the section lawyers increasingly defined the Thirteenth
Amendment in terms of economic coercion in the late 1940s, they
drew on changing academic, political, and popular meanings of peonage and involuntary servitude. These meanings stemmed from the
social and economic “realities” of involuntary servitude, which the
earlier attention to contract had overshadowed. Political scientist
Howard Devon Hamilton, for example, defined peonage “[i]n every
day parlance” as “used loosely to cover almost any variety of forced
52
labor, or simply exploited labor.” Moreover, Hamilton extended his
discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment from peonage proper to
“peonage-like conditions,” condemning the latter as those in which
53
“men get sick or die from overwork or bad conditions.” He discussed how contract workers were “farm[ed] out” to other employers
during slack periods and how Mexican workers endured “hideous liv54
ing conditions and . . . low wages.” Hamilton was not alone in thinking that peonage encompassed all of these coercions and indignities.
Although some lawyers continued to emphasize the importance of
forced immobility in making out legal claims, the conditions of the
work, the hardship it entailed, and the inadequate pay often sufficed
55
to demonstrate “practical peonage” among non-lawyers.
Complaints to the Department of Justice and to organizations like
the NAACP reflected these changes in the meaning of involuntary
servitude. Male agricultural laborers began to protest their lack of
amenities, rather than the violent or contractual means by which they
were forced to work. They “wore rags” and slept in “chicken
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56

house[s]” or on “old rusty cot[s].” Moreover, a new group of workers began to complain about involuntary servitude in similar terms.
Female domestic workers like Elizabeth Coker, Polly Johnson, and
Dora Jones complained about the poor conditions of their working
lives, their isolation from American freedom, and their exclusion
57
from its plenty. They emphasized lack of pay, degrading conditions,
58
and work too onerous for their sex. They rarely mentioned forced
immobility. In fact, Polly Johnson testified not that she was kept by
force, but that “she was not allowed to leave [her employer’s] premises except when [her employer] sent her to the store and then she
had to return within a given period.” Because Johnson could leave
her workplace and home unaccompanied, the essence of her servitude was not in the force by which she was held, but rather the conditions that ensured that she would indeed “return within a given pe59
At the heart of such complaints was the sense that these
riod.”
women, as Elizabeth Coker put it, had “never enjoyed any [of the]
60
privileges of a free person.”
Dora Jones’ similar complaints led to a watershed case in 1947.
Judge Jacob Weinberger decided that the conviction of Elizabeth Ingalls for holding Jones as a slave was novel and important enough to
warrant the publication of his opinion denying Ingalls’ motion for a
61
new trial. Because the case was prosecuted under the Slave Kidnapping Statute, the trial court emphasized the conditions of Jones’ life
62
in a way never before discussed in a published opinion. The essence
of slavery for the court was the subjection of the will of one individual
to that of another. For more than twenty-five years, Jones had been
required to arise at an early hour in the morning and perform practically
all of the household labor in connection with the maintenance of the Ingalls household. She was forbidden to leave the household except for
the commission of errands and performed drudgery of the most menial
and laborious type . . . .
56
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All this, he noted, was performed “without compensation[,] . . . days
off[,] . . . [or] vacation[s].” Jones’ “quarters were among the poorest
in the several homes occupied by the defendant during this period of
years.” Her board “was of a substantially lower standard than that
63
common to servants generally.”
After detailing additional poor treatment, the court concluded
that “the servant, Dora L. Jones, was a person wholly subject to the
will of defendant; that she was one who had no freedom of action
and whose person and services were wholly under the control of defendant and who was in a state of enforced compulsory service to the
defendant.” The facts of Jones’ life spoke for themselves: an individual exercising her free will would simply not have countenanced such
treatment. That Jones had opportunities to leave and did not suggested all the more that she was indeed “wholly subject to the will of
64
[the] defendant” with “no freedom of action” of her own. She was,
65
as the Los Angeles Times put it, “a 20th century slave.”
The chain of reasoning that led to a conviction in Ingalls differed
greatly from that which had led to peonage convictions less than a
decade earlier. In the intervening period, promising complaints began to include not only physical restraint and imprisonment but also
the quality of the victims’ lives and the conditions of their work. By
1952, Ingalls represented an acute example of the modern slavery and
involuntary servitude the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited. In discussing the question whether “slavery” and “involuntary servitude”
should be considered the same thing, CRS lawyer Sydney Brodie concluded that because Ingalls had been such an extreme case, it had not
66
disposed of the problem. “The sordid facts of the case actually established more than mere unwilling labor, service rendered another
because of duress, fear, threats or intimidation,” Brodie wrote. Even
someone with “privileges such as going home after work, receiving
some remuneration, maintaining a form of private life,” privileges
that Jones most certainly did not enjoy, might still “clearly be in a
67
condition of involuntary servitude” even if not slavery itself.
Elizabeth Ingalls’s sentence also represented this new gloss on the
Thirteenth Amendment. Prior to Ingalls, criminal prosecutions of involuntary servitude, like criminal prosecutions generally, primarily
aimed to vindicate the government itself. The perpetrator’s fine and
63
64
65
66
67
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prison term served as restitution owed for violating the laws of the nation. In a departure from the past, Judge Weinberger required Ingalls to provide restitution to Jones in the amount of $6,000. This was
above and beyond Ingalls’s suspended prison sentence and a $2,500
fine she had to pay the government. The harm, then, was not only
against the government but also against Dora Jones personally. The
case had made much of the Ingallses’ failure to pay Jones, and the
sentence provided her with remuneration for her work.
As Ingalls drew headlines, waves of similar complaints hit the DOJ.
Whereas in 1946, CRS attorney Leo Meltzer had described Polly
Johnson’s case as “not the ordinary type of peonage or involuntary
servitude situation,” by 1948 such cases were legion. The complainants described, almost uniformly, how the victims worked long, hard
hours with little or no pay other than paltry room and board and
some clothing to wear. The lack of schooling these victims received,
and the lack of modern amenities they could access, indicated that
such workers lacked freedom in the modern, postwar sense of the
68
word.
The CRS saw some success in other cases like Ingalls. Yet the section lawyers still sought better enforcement mechanisms for such cases. Though the conditions in which some people lived seemed
“shocking,” U.S. attorneys and the lawyers in Washington lamented
that they were “only a violation of the laws of civilized society and not
the laws of the Federal Government.” In 1951, both the Senate and
the House considered legislation to bolster the legal tools for eliminating involuntary servitude. As part of the House consideration of
the bill, Civil Rights Section Chief George Triedman testified before a
subcommittee about the need for further changes to the involuntary
69
servitude statutes. Complaints of forced labor conditions kept “coming up and hitting us constantly,” Triedman reported. He and his attorneys found themselves “powerless to go forward” with prosecutions
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under the laws as they then stood. They were “frustrated with a situation where a condition exists like this.” Although the section had few
attorneys and no need “to borrow any more work,” it nonetheless
70
pursued wider jurisdiction in involuntary servitude cases. “[T]here
are actual cases of happenings that have come across my table as well
as members of my section and there are no other laws to meet them,”
Triedman explained. “That is what prompted us, even at this late
date, even after 75 years, to come in and see if we can modernize
71
them a bit.”
The cases Triedman brought to Congress’s attention illustrated
how much the section’s view of the Thirteenth Amendment and involuntary servitude was now informed by the New Deal’s economic
protections. The classic case of peonage—of the poor black man in
the rural South held for debt in either agricultural or rural nonagricultural work (like timber or sugar refining) by violence, threats of
violence, and arrest—had given way to a New Deal-based understanding about who was forced to work and how. Of the four prototypical
cases Triedman described to the committee, only two conformed to
the traditional image of involuntary servitude: one employer held his
worker through violence and another through threats of arrest. The
other two both involved female victims, one of whom was a domestic
worker. Triedman spent a considerable part of his testimony describ72
ing the women’s plight and the federal law’s inability to help them.
The CRS thus used its Thirteenth Amendment practice to complement the gaps in the New Deal’s economic protections. The CRS
aimed to protect not just industrial and agricultural workers, but all
workers. The section included domestic workers normally thought to
occupy a private sphere immune from governmental intervention.
Although Triedman tried to assure his congressional audience that
his bill “would effect no radical change in existing law and would not
extend the jurisdiction of the Department to any new situation or
type of case,” his domestic worker example belied those reassurances.
Such examples were revolutionary, as they indicated a willingness to
use federal law to intrude into relationships of household labor, rela-
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tionships that Congress had deemed local, private, and off-limits to
73
the federal government.
The content of the Thirteenth Amendment in the CRS’s cases
thus came once again from the New Deal. The economic coercion
that ensured immobility in such cases—evidenced not by violence or
force of law but by the individual’s apparent inability to save herself
from objectionable conditions—had never before received systematic
federal attention. But the New Deal’s partial promise to provide economic security to the American people had wrought a revolution in
expectations about work, working conditions, and free will. Against
the backdrop of promised federal protection for minimum wages,
maximum hours, collective bargaining, and free movement within
the labor market, a person choosing his or her employment would
obviously not choose to work very long days under squalid and dehumanizing conditions. The baseline was a low one. As the judge
had suggested in Ingalls, Dora Jones was properly compared to other
domestic workers who were not enslaved, not to some middle-class or
even working-class ideal. It was not, however, necessary for the conditions to deteriorate so far that the victims became slaves without any
free will at all before the federal government could intervene. Rather, as section lawyer Sydney Brodie made clear in 1951, the Thirteenth Amendment could protect even those who (unlike Jones) enjoyed “privileges such as going home after work, receiving some
74
remuneration, [and] maintaining a form of private life.”
***
By the early 1950s, then, much had changed from the Lochner era.
In slightly different ways, each of the section’s three expansive interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment showed how African Americans could benefit from new, New Deal-based conceptions of positive
rights. The first interpretation understood New Deal promises of “security” to encompass the “safety and security of the person,” including peonage and involuntary servitude. The second expanded the
New Deal’s free labor protections to the South and to the African
American agricultural and domestic workers purposefully restricted
by state laws and purposefully unprotected by federal ones. And the
last expanded New Deal rights to economic security to the same two
groups legislatively excluded from such protections.
73
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Each of these expansions of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections built on a different application of the New Deal’s concern for
workers to African American workers specifically. Where the New
Deal had emphasized labor and economic rights and assisted African
Americans only partially and incidentally, these novel involuntary servitude prosecutions aimed to bring African Americans within the New
Deal rights framework. Following changing trends within the involuntary servitude complaints of African Americans themselves, the
CRS lawyers went about expanding the meaning of involuntary servitude—and the accompanying protection of the Thirteenth Amendment—in order to make the Constitution serviceable for African
Americans in the post-New Deal era.
The close correspondence between the CRS’s Thirteenth
Amendment practice and New Deal conceptions of governmental
protections of rights becomes even clearer when viewed not only in
contrast to the Lochner-era, contract-based Thirteenth Amendment
paradigm that preceded it but also to the conception of the Thirteenth Amendment in the succeeding era. When the Supreme Court
discussed the Thirteenth Amendment at length for the first time in
75
twenty-five years in the 1969 case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the
Amendment was hardly recognizable. In Jones, the Court addressed
the question of whether a civil rights statute passed pursuant to the
Thirteenth Amendment could proscribe private discrimination in
housing. According to the Court, the Amendment empowered Congress to protect the freedom of African Americans “[a]t the very
least . . . to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wher76
ever a white man can live.”
In concurrence, Justice William O.
Douglas offered a long list of the “badges of slavery” he thought Congress could prohibit under the Thirteenth Amendment. These included discrimination in voting and jury service; segregation of courtrooms, schools, transportation, public accommodations, and
housing; and bans on interracial marriage. In this description, the
prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment were essentially the same
as the Fourteenth Amendment with one major difference: unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth had no state action requirement. Because the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery
and involuntary servitude wholesale, the Court reasoned, legislation
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passed on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment, like that at issue
77
in Jones, could proscribe private as well as public discrimination.
From the perspective of the pre-Brown era, the most striking thing
about the Jones Court’s description of the Thirteenth Amendment
was not what it included but what it omitted: any mention of labor or
economic rights. Although labor questions pervaded the Reconstruction-era history the Court cited to support its view of the Amendment, that labor pedigree was detached from the Court’s description
of how the Thirteenth Amendment operated in 1969. Justice Douglas’ long list of racial wrongs did not even mention labor or employment.
Just as the early twentieth-century understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment derived from Lochner-based free contract and the
mid-century paradigm took its cues from the New Deal, the Court’s
framing of the Thirteenth Amendment in this way was a product of
78
the times. In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,
lawyers, courts, and commentators had generally converged on a civil
rights framework characterized by a focus on formal equality and a
negative understanding of rights as constraining rather than enabling
government action. By 1969, equal protection analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment had become the dominant way of thinking
about civil rights: it prevented government actors from segregating
or discriminating on the basis of race in a variety of circumstances.
As a result, by the time the Court decided Jones, it was difficult to envision the Thirteenth Amendment as anything but an equal protection guarantee without a state action requirement.
***
Discussion of the variety of uses to which scholars, lawyers, and
legislatures have put the Thirteenth Amendment in more recent
79
years is beyond the scope of this paper. Gesturing at the way in
which one burgeoning new vision of the amendment—that reflected
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in Michael Wishnie’s paper for this symposium—might benefit from
the history I have told here will have to suffice. According to Wishnie, the Thirteenth Amendment can, and should, be used to protect
immigrants, and especially immigrant workers, suffering exploitation,
immobility, and servitude as a result of their economic and immigrant status.
My paper might serve as an interpretive resource for arguments
like Wishnie’s in two ways. First, this paper provokes the question of
why contemporary lawyers and legal scholars (for Wishnie is not
alone) have begun to think about the protections the Thirteenth
Amendment might offer immigrants. In an era of massive globalization, a greater focus on international human rights, and a growing
trans-national antislavery movement, this focus should be no surprise.
Awareness of the connection between Wishnie’s doctrinal arguments
and the larger political and legal trends that support it can facilitate
more trenchant, and perhaps more successful, legal arguments. To
the extent that past visions of the Amendment have succeeded because they have traded on widely held assumptions about the nature
of legal protection and those entitled to it, novel understandings of
the amendment might do well to follow their lead.
Second, the history I have told here suggests a deep strain in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence for the kinds of arguments that
Wishnie and others hope to make. It is not necessary to prove that
the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment were concerned with immigrant labor in order for history to be useful to today’s advocates.
Rather, the history of the Thirteenth Amendment in the Lochner era,
the New Deal, and the 1960s reveals how significantly the meaning of
the Thirteenth Amendment has changed over time. Lawyers who
draw on current concerns about citizenship and exclusion, migration
and immigration, globalization and internationalization are no less
legitimate heirs to the Thirteenth Amendment than the lawyers of
the CRS in creating their New Deal-inflected vision of labor freedom
and economic security. The meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment
was not fixed in time in 1865, nor in 1911, nor 1945, nor 1969. Arguments about its meaning today can draw on the historical, not the
original, pedigree of the Amendment even as they interpret it anew.

